The Course of the War in Sudan – November 2025

INTRODUCTION: Kordofan in Focus: Frontline Shifts and Progress in the South

November 2025 marked a period when fighting in the Sudan war intensified around Kordofan and reshaped the Darfur-Khartoum axis. After Al-Fasher fell under Rapid Support Forces (RSF) control in late October, the war’s focus shifted west to Kordofan, where Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) faced multi-front battles with both the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) and RSF units. At the same time, increased airstrikes along the Khartoum-Atbara corridor, supported by RSF’s consolidated external backing, signaled a shift in strategy from “city sieges” to nationwide expansion. The developments showed the conflict widening into multiple fronts rather than narrowing geographically.

Extent of Geographical Expansion and Intensity of the Attacks

South and North Kordofan

November was one of the periods with the highest civilian casualties in the Sudan war. On Nov. 1, an RSF drone strike on a shelter in Al-Abbasiya Tagali in South Kordofan killed at least seven civilians and wounded many others. On Nov. 4, a drone attack on a funeral in the village of Uwaynat in North Kordofan killed at least 40 civilians. The two incidents show the RSF has institutionalized tactics that target civilians.

From Nov. 5-9, the Sudanese Army repelled RSF artillery and drone attacks around al-Obeid and Babnousa. On Nov. 8, a China-made RSF drone shot down over el-Obeid again highlighted the group’s foreign supply networks. Heavy fighting on Nov. 9 in Babnousa in West Kordofan showed the area had become a new center of the war.

From Nov. 12-15, the SAF reestablished control in Umm Dham Haj Ahmed, Habila and Kazgil. In the same period, an RSF drone strike on the Bashayer oil processing station in al-Jabalain showed the war had reached a stage threatening energy security. Starting Nov. 15, the army expanded its counteroffensives in Kordofan and retook numerous villages.

In the final week of the month, fighting flared again along the Babnousa line. RSF attacks, carried out with reinforcements brought from Darfur and FPV-type suicide drones, were repelled by army artillery and air support. On Nov. 24, operations coordinated by the 22nd Infantry Division reportedly led to the evacuation of 177,000 civilians. By late November 2025, the town of Babnousa had emerged as the Sudanese Army’s main defensive line against the RSF in Kordofan.

Sudan, Egypt, and Libya Border Zone

On Nov. 22, the SAF destroyed a military convoy in an airstrike that was reportedly sent from eastern Libya to support the RSF and linked to Haftar. More than 50 armored vehicles and fuel and ammunition tankers were destroyed. The incident heightened the risk of the war becoming more regional.

Darfur and Southern Frontlines

A drone believed to belong to the Sudanese Army struck the Tagru gold mine in North Darfur on Nov. 16, signaling a shift toward targeting RSF-linked economic assets. From Nov. 27-30, the army retook areas around Al-Abbasiya Tagali in South Kordofan — including Tabsa, al-Damra, Gardoud Jama and al-Mureib — from the RSF and its ally SPLM-N. It was the army’s largest territorial gain in South Kordofan since 2023.

Actors and Tactical Shifts

Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF):

• Implemented a “gradual encirclement” strategy to reestablish ground superiority in Kordofan.
• Activated air-defense systems along the Babnousa, el-Obeid and Atbara corridor, downing numerous drones.
• Prioritized protecting energy infrastructure and key facilities, including the Merowe Dam and the Bashayer oil complex.
• Intensified air operations against external supply routes coming from the Libya and South Sudan borders.

Rapid Support Forces (RSF):

• Shifted from direct attacks on city centers to targeting energy, infrastructure, and tribal sites.
• Used FPV suicide drones and China-made drones to wear down defensive lines in Khartoum and Kordofan.
• Brought in mercenaries from South Sudan to reinforce the Babnousa and Dilling fronts.

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) 

• Reemerged in November, coordinating with the RSF along the Habila-Kartala line to slow the army’s advance.
• By the end of the month, the army’s capture of seven villages around Al-Abbasiya Tagali was a major setback for the SPLM-N.

Assessment and Outlook

• The Kordofan front has become the war’s strategic center. RSF concentration there is part of its strategy to maintain control in Darfur and besiege Khartoum.
• The army’s November advances show it has regained some ground, though the sustainability of these gains is uncertain.
• Attacks on energy infrastructure are accelerating economic collapse and deepening the humanitarian crisis nationwide.
• The risk of regional intervention has risen due to connections with Libya and South Sudan, making the Sudan war no longer explainable by internal dynamics alone.

Short-term outlook: fighting in Kordofan is expected to concentrate around Babnousa and Al-Abbasiya Tagali, while the RSF is likely to target strategic sites near the Merowe Dam and Khartoum.

Long-term outlook: front-line balances in Sudan will depend less on territorial control and more on the sustainability of supply lines, signaling a shift toward a “decentralized war” structure.

CONCLUSION

November 2025 marked a new phase in the Sudan war as Kordofan became the conflict’s central hub after the devastation in Darfur. RSF attacks, carried out without regard for civilians, have expanded the war to the country’s eastern and southern fronts. Sudan’s future now hinges not only on military balances but also on vulnerabilities in energy, humanitarian access, and cross-border security. ORSAM will continue to monitor the developments and their regional implications.