Vladimir Putin’s announcement that the “main part” of the Russian forces in Syria will be withdrawn not only caught many experts in academic and intelligence community by surprise but also astounded people on all sides of the conflict.
Russia deployed forces to Syria in September 2015 with an agenda of war withthe Islamic State (ISIS) and other terror groups, but many argued thatRussianintervention in Syria is a cover for bolstering Assad regime, its long-time ally and a client state. Many analysts also believed that Russia's real objective was to secure its footprint in the Middle East and end its international isolation brought on by intervening in Ukraine. For doing so, Russia had deployed warplanes, warships, and 4,000 troops to protect its military installations and assist Syrian government forces. It also deployed the weaponry such as SA-22 (Pantsir 1) antiaircraft missilesand advanced S-400 missile defense systems after Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet allegedly for having crossed into Turkish airspace.
Althoughfrom the inception of the Syrian uprising in 2011 Moscow never hid its intentions to protect Assad regime with loans,advisors, and weapons and diplomatically (through political cover in the Security Council), however the deployment of troops, suggested a qualitative change in Russia’s involvement.
Determining the exact goals of intervening in clashes can be tricky particularly when an outside power intervene in a war that is not an immediate threat. This has been the case in regards with Russian involvement in Syrian war in which generated an enormous debate among experts to determine Russia’s goal. But whatever the reason of intervention could be, the most urgent question is that what factors contributed to the Putin’s decision to degrade its military exposure in Syria after not so long direct involvement. This article holds that a certain degree of pragmatism has guided Putin’s multi-faceted decision for this partial withdrawal:
First, as many commentators argued,from its very inception, the Russian military deployment was intended to be a short-term operation in order to protect Assad’s regime. Notwithstanding with the fact that Moscowhas made no commitment about what its involvement in Syria would bringor how to defeat the Islamic State (ISIS) and other opposition forces, the Russian military involvement was supposed to help the Assad regime to stay in power, a mission that apparently has been accomplished. Syrian armed forces achieved a major turnaroundin the fight against ISIS and other terror groups and regained their control over some key areas (Alawite regions) while degrading the capabilities of the opposition forces.The destruction of much of ISIS oil infrastructure along with loss of territory forced it to cut its fighters’ salaries, and spurred increasing numbers of defections. That does not put Assad in a position to retake the entire country, but at least it restores the stalemate that he had maintained in 2014.
Therefore, the Russian move mightbe a reflection that Putin is now confident in Assad’s renewed stability and can afford to step back. More, unlike their past stance the Syrian opposition among them the United States has come to accept that Assad has a certain degree of benefit to stay in power.
Second, Putin’s intervention demonstrated that the military was capable to launch and sustain an intervention outside of the former Soviet Union, bringing Russia back to center stage as a global powerand that Moscow could change facts on the ground in Syria by projecting its power.Since coming to power as president in 2000 hehas been seeking to regain Moscow’s political influence and restore Russian status as a Great Power in the regionwithin the context of zero-sum anti-Westernism and a competitor to the United States.Russia’s intervention in Syria demonstratedthat its military is capable to prevent regime change in Damascus by outside powers. It was also provedU.S. is not the only power that is capable to project its power in other parts of the globe, a factor that would force Washington to accommodate Russia’s goals in the Middle East. Seen within this context, the operation in Syria was designed to bolster Putin’s domestic and global standing. Hence, the mission is done and Putinachieve no benefit from continuing to repeat it.
Third, testing its weapons in real combat: Moscow has spent $81 billion or 4.1% of its GDP to modernize its military hardware. Putin had no chance to test effectiveness of its latest military technology and see how they operate in the battlefield since war in Afghanistan. The annexation of Crimea was a swift operation without Russia’s direct involvement, a unique opportunity that was provided by Syria. Besides, Russian forces were also demonstrated their tactics and strategy. Russia set up its operations near Latakia in less than three weeks and deployed itsmilitary weaponries which demonstrated Russia’s ability to move fast. Proving that Russia is no longer a weak force that could be bullied by the West, the message is delivered and the task is accomplished.
Fourth, Syria-Ukraine connection; as highlighted by George Friedman,the Russian deployment was part of elaborate Washington-Moscownegotiations. While the United States couldn’t overtly support the Assad regime, it came to a realization that Washington needs a stable Syrian government to contain the Islamic State. Thus,Washington may offered a major concession on Ukraine, something Obama may happily agree. At the same time, Russia desperately wants to neutralizeUkraine and see it outside NATO security guarantees. Seen within this context, the next step will be Washington-Moscowgrand bargain on a new balance in Ukraine.
Fifth,Putin understood thatAssad has been re-equipped, and is able to fight with support of Hezbollah and Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Therefore Russia’smoreinvolvement in Surya may make a trap similar to the Afghan trap to the Russian forces, a scenario that has been set up by some of the sponsors of the Syrian opposition through increasing the capabilities of the opposition forcesto draw the Russian forces into increasing land engagement.
Sixth, the Saudi-led drop in oil price has crippled the Russian economy, thus the timing of the Putin’s decision could be seen as an overture to Riyadh to boost the price of oil. Russian withdrawal could be a signal to the Riyadh that Moscow would addresses some of its concerns and interests in which creates conditions for a compromise. Saudis would welcome reducing support for the Assad regime and may encourage them to take steps to reduce output and support increasing oil price.
Seventh, Putin’s announcementcould also be seen as his warning to Assad that the Russian support is not endless and he should not takeMoscow support for granted. Recently, there have been growing signs of differences between Russia and the Syrian government over the Geneva talks, which Moscow has pressed hard for, along with Washington. The withdrawal sending a message that Syria must reach a political solution.The move put Assad under such a pressure to seriously negotiate a peaceful political transition in Geneva that would ensure the continuation of a Syrian state and accepting a political settlement to the war, which has killed 250,000 people.
Finally, the decision may partly be fuelled by costs it bears. The benefits of staying in Syria no longer outweighed the costs;with Russia’s facing deepening economic problems because of falling oil prices, fighting in Syria could be considered an unnecessary cost. Russia remains mindful of the $3 million daily cost of its involvement in Syria while collapsing oil prices. Economic sanctions imposed by the West are hurting Russia’s economy, thus the move could also be driven by a desire to end Russia's isolation and Western sanctions. Seen within this context, the withdrawal was rational decision by Putin to declare victory and extricate his country from a costly military venture.Therefore, with resumption of peace talks in Geneva, Russia saw an opportunity to end its operation “with honor” and withdraw from Syria rather than risk humiliating setbacks in the future.
Concluding Remarks
Whatever the reason of the withdrawal is, the most important questions arehow the move would affect the war’s outcome,what dynamics it could bring to the chaotic scene in Damascus and whether it will provide an opening for the Assad opponents to resume their drive towards regime change in Syria?
Some may argue that with the disappearance of Russian deterrence, the way for other actors to step in, mainly Turkey and the Saudi Arabiamay reopens, and Turkish-Saudi appetites to invade Syria might be whetted.Turkey and the Saudi Arabia could feel the absence of Russia greater leeway for them to be present in the theater, but it is important to note that a Russian military pullback will not leave Assad’s forces completely alone, because he also has support from Hezbollah and Iran which probably will boost its support to the Assad regime.
This article was published in Ortadoğu Analiz journal with the title of “Understanding of Putin’s Syrian Surprise”
