As of June 13, 2025, the conflict between Israel and Iran has escalated into a new phase, and Iraq is among the countries most at risk of being drawn into a broader regional war. Tensions that have risen since Oct. 7, 2023, have already had significant repercussions on the ground in Iraq. Before the current escalation, Iran had described Erbil as a “Mossad base,” and its ballistic missile attacks in January 2024 highlight a pre-existing line of confrontation directly targeting the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government (IKRG). At the same time, the possibility of Israel striking Iran-backed Shiite militias in Iraq could reshape the security perceptions of both the central government in Baghdad and the IKRG. Beyond military threats, the deepening conflict could also shift internal power dynamics within the IKRG, alter its standing in Baghdad, and redefine its regional alliances.
Future of Iran-PUK Relations
The war’s impact on Iraq extends beyond the risk of direct conflict; it also has the potential to reshape the attitudes and strategies of political actors within the IKRG. This transformation could influence not only internal Kurdish politics but also how these actors position themselves in Baghdad and interact at the regional level. In this context, the position of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which has traditionally maintained close ties with Iran, is particularly significant. The PUK, a key ally of the Shiite Coordination Framework that currently governs Iraq, has a long-standing relationship with Tehran. Under the leadership of Bafel Talabani, who became party president in 2021, the PUK has further strengthened its ties with Iran — both in Baghdad’s political sphere and through security cooperation. Talabani positioned the PUK within the coalition government led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, formed alongside Shiite groups. This alliance has also served as political leverage against the Erbil-based Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). As a result, while relations between Iran-backed groups like the Badr Organization and the Sadiqun Bloc and the KDP have remained tense, the PUK has maintained more constructive ties with these factions.
Despite the currently positive trajectory of Iran-PUK relations, it is important to note that the PUK — unlike the KDP — has managed to maintain simultaneous ties with both Iran and the U.S. However, in the context of an ongoing conflict, it is likely that the second Donald Trump administration would be less willing to view the PUK as a primary political partner in Iraq, given its close relationship with Iran. In this regard, the PUK’s alignment with Tehran could increasingly come under scrutiny, particularly considering U.S. regional policy priorities.
Additionally, two key factors are further narrowing the PUK’s strategic room for maneuver: Iran’s declining influence in the region following the events of Oct. 7, and the inauguration of the Trump administration in January 2025. Compared to the Biden administration, officials overseeing the Iraq portfolio under Trump are expected to show significantly less tolerance for Iran’s presence in Iraq. These developments and emerging dynamics are pushing the PUK toward a new political phase in which it may be forced to reevaluate its relationship with Iran.
Indeed, early signs of a new phase in the Iran-Israel conflict have already begun to emerge. In this context, an official statement issued by the PUK strongly condemned Israel’s attacks on Iran and its violation of Iraqi airspace. Notably, the statement also referenced “This escalation is not only reckless — it is deliberately timed to sabotage the diplomatic efforts initiated under the leadership of President Trump, ” marking a significant and favorable nod to the U.S. president. This reference may indicate an indirect attempt by the PUK to align itself more closely with the strategic direction of the second Trump administration.
Such a move toward alignment could become more pronounced if Iran’s regional influence continues to wane. These signals are not limited to rhetoric — they may also materialize in Baghdad’s post-election political landscape. In this regard, the PUK may gradually distance itself from Iran-aligned factions and seek new alliances with dominant figures in Baghdad politics, such as Muqtada al-Sadr, who emphasize Iraqi national identity and advocate for a unity government. Another possible scenario is that Shiite political groups in Iraq may begin to soften their pro-Iran image to safeguard their future influence in a region where Tehran’s power is diminishing. If this occurs, the PUK could adopt a flexible stance — maintaining its existing alliances with Shiite actors while adapting to this shifting political identity.
Potential threats, opportunities for KDP
Among the actors in the IKRG, the KDP is likely to feel the effects of the Israel-Iran conflict most directly. As one of the U.S.’ closest allies in Iraq, the KDP is also among the primary targets of Iran’s regional operations. This distinguishes the KDP from the PUK, both in terms of its regional policy orientation and the intensity of the security threats it faces. Unlike the PUK, the KDP has not pursued a balancing strategy between Iran and the U.S. Instead, it has adopted a clearly U.S.-aligned position. This stance has made the Erbil-based KDP administration more vulnerable to direct military threats from Iran. The KDP’s foreign policy choices have also shaped its political standing in Baghdad, where it remains outside the ruling Shiite coalition and maintains a distant relationship with Iran-aligned Shiite factions. As a result, the KDP diverges from the PUK not only in the internal power dynamics of the IKRG but also in its positioning within Iraq’s broader alliance architecture.
From the KDP’s perspective, the most critical risk posed by the war is the possibility of being targeted by Iran or Iran-backed political and armed groups in Iraq. Past events support this concern: Iran has previously launched ballistic missiles at Erbil, and Shiite militia groups have repeatedly labeled various sites in Erbil as “Mossad bases.” These claims suggest that the threat is not merely rhetorical but also a real and imminent one. Although, so far, the conflict has resulted in only a few drones landing near Erbil without causing major security incidents, this has not changed the fragile nature of the current stability. If the war continues — especially if the U.S. becomes directly involved — Iran may respond with retaliatory measures through Iraq. In that scenario, Iran could target the Iraq’s Kurdish region, particularly Erbil, as part of its response strategy. This is increasingly seen as a likely outcome.
From a political standpoint, if the KDP can navigate the current war without facing a major security crisis or significant losses, it could gain several strategic advantages. In particular, if Iran’s regional influence weakens because of the conflict and that shift is reflected in Iraq, the U.S. may choose to elevate the KDP among Iraq’s Kurdish political groups—providing it with greater support in both IKRG and Baghdad politics. The positive history and current impact of figures like U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s relations with the KDP during the Trump administration could accelerate this process. The first signs of such a shift may appear during post-election negotiations over the formation of a new government. In that context, the KDP could emerge as a more decisive actor within Iraq’s political structure. However, these scenarios largely depend on whether the KDP can emerge from the Iran-Israel conflict with minimal damage.
The Israel-Iran war has the potential to reshape power dynamics not only at the regional level but also within Iraq’s internal political structure — especially in the IKRG. The conflict may impact not just the IKRG’s security, but also its internal political balance, standing in Baghdad, and relations with regional powers. The PUK, with its traditionally close ties to Iran and its ongoing effort to maintain a dual-track relationship with the U.S., finds its room for maneuver increasingly constrained by shifting regional dynamics. The post–Oct. 7 environment — including Iran’s declining influence, the return of the Trump administration, and the ongoing conflict — represents a confluence of forces that could redefine the PUK’s alliance architecture. Meanwhile, the KDP, which has adopted a more explicit, U.S.-aligned strategy, faces the highest risk of direct security threats as a result of the war. Iran’s past missile attacks on Erbil and accusations by Iran-backed groups have turned the theoretical risk of spillover into a practical threat for the IKRG. However, if the KDP manages to emerge from the conflict with minimal damage, it could significantly boost its strategic importance in the eyes of Washington. This could translate into increased political leverage during post-election negotiations and enhance the KDP’s role in shaping the next government in Baghdad. In sum, the Israel-Iran war carries the potential to redefine political competition within the IKRG and reshape Iraq’s broader political landscape — prompting a realignment of external alliances and forcing political actors to recalibrate their strategic positions.
