One of the most memorable operations of the Vietnam War was the Tet Offensive in 1968. The offensive launched by communist forces in the North caused a rupture both among American decision-makers and within American society, cementing the perception that the war could not be won. The intensifying debate in American society and politics would, a few years later, lead the United States to withdraw its forces and leave the South to the Northern forces. However, when subjected to an operational assessment, the Tet Offensive was not militarily successful. The capital, Saigon, was not captured, and Northern forces were forced to withdraw after suffering more than 110,000 casualties (45,000 killed, 5,000 missing and 60,000 wounded). So why was the U.S. unable to turn back this repelled attack into a victory? How did this tactical defeat become a strategic victory for the North? This is where expectations and perceptions come into play. The development that caused the U.S. to lose the war in the minds of many was not battlefield losses, but the fact that after years of fighting, the North dared not only to refuse surrender but to launch an assault aimed at capturing the capital, Saigon. It was not the losses in the field that defeated the U.S., but that audacity.
Vietnam was followed by American operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and many other places that were militarily successful in the short term but failed in the long term to achieve strategic and political objectives. Lately, the question circulating in everyone’s mind is whether Iran will be the latest link in this chain. U.S. President Donald Trump announced to the world the Iran attack he launched with Israel on Feb. 28 under the name “Epic Fury.” According to Trump, it was “one of the largest, most complex, most overwhelming military operations the world has ever seen — unlike anything anyone has ever witnessed before.” Within minutes, Trump said, hundreds of targets were struck, including Revolutionary Guard facilities and Iranian air defense systems; nine ships and naval bases were disabled; and all of it occurred in a matter of minutes. In the same speech, Trump announced that Iran’s “supreme leader,” Ayatollah Khamenei, and the entire military chain of command had also been killed. He was confident in the power of his military and the victory he would achieve: “The world has never seen an army like the one we have; frankly, there is no other army that comes close.” Among the objectives of the operation, Trump cited the elimination of Iran’s entire military infrastructure and, beyond that, the collapse of the current Iranian regime. He advised the Iranian people to establish a new regime in place of the one that would be toppled. As can be seen, the objectives of the operation were highly maximalist. Although Trump did not specify a clear timetable, the time horizon implied by his framing was equally short. Under these circumstances, the success of the operation will be determined by the extent to which the U.S. can achieve these definitive objectives within a short period of time.
As of the third day of the operation (March 2), it is possible to speak of a serious asymmetric loss to Iran’s detriment. The targets Trump mentioned were indeed destroyed within minutes. On the third day of the war, the U.S. Department of Defense announced at a news conference that the U.S. had achieved air superiority over Iran. However, the term air superiority is less assertive than air supremacy or air dominance. U.S. and NATO military doctrine and training documents define air superiority as the degree of control that permits air operations to be conducted without prohibitive interference by the opposing side. The U.S. and Israel have largely achieved this. Over the past three days, Iran’s air defense systems, as in the 12-Day War in June 2025, have been largely neutralized. Thanks to this air superiority, U.S. and Israeli air forces are able, as of the third day of the war, to conduct 1,000 sorties per day over Iran.
However, despite the significant weakening of Iran’s air defenses, armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) belonging to the U.S. and Israel can still be shot down. If we also include the three fighter jets that, according to U.S. statements, were brought down by friendly fire over Kuwaiti airspace, it becomes clear that air superiority has not reached the desired level. Given that Iran carried out more than 1,200 missile and drone attacks against five different countries in the first 48 hours of the war, the U.S. and Israel have not yet been able to elevate their advantage in Iranian airspace to the level of air supremacy.
Indeed, in Iran’s retaliatory strikes, as of the first three days, casualties were reported not only among four American service members and 12 Israeli citizens but also in the targeted Gulf countries. As of the third day, Iran announced that 555 of its citizens had been killed in the attacks, signaling that it is prepared to carry the war into the economic domain and wage a war of attrition. In a statement on the second day of the war, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said, “We’ve had two decades to study defeats of the U.S. military to our immediate east and west. […] Bombings in our capital have no impact on our ability to conduct war. Decentralized Mosaic Defense enables us to decide when—and how—war will end.”
Despite the heavy losses it has suffered, Iran, on the one hand, has largely closed the Strait of Hormuz to tanker traffic, while on the other it has been able to target Ras Tanura — Saudi Arabia’s largest refinery, with a daily processing capacity of 550,000 barrels — along with Bahrain International Airport, symbols of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) economy such as Burj Khalifa, Burj Al Arab and Palm Jumeirah, and the Ras Laffan and Mesaieed energy facilities in Qatar. In addition to these economic targets, Iran has also been able to target with missiles and drones the U.S. 5th Fleet headquarters in Bahrain and Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, as well as many targets in Israel.
The emerging picture shows that despite suffering extremely heavy losses in the first three days of the war, Iran is still able to impose costs on countries hosting U.S. bases in the region, alongside the U.S. and Israel. Many uncertainties remain about the future of the war. Will the U.S. and Israel be able to elevate their air superiority over Iranian airspace to full air supremacy? How many missiles and drones does Iran still have in stock? How many of the launch ramps and platforms for Iran’s aerial strike assets remain operational, and for how long can they continue to be used? Even if the U.S. achieves complete air supremacy over Iran, will Iran surrender, or can it continue to impose costs through asymmetric attacks using proxy militia forces under its control? In a scenario where these costs continue to rise, how many aircraft, how much ammunition, and how many troops can the U.S. tolerate losing? How long can it continue to deploy air-defense missiles costing millions of dollars to shoot down drones worth $20,000–30,000? In a scenario where the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, how long can the Gulf economies withstand being targeted? Questions and scenarios could be further diversified, but one thing is clear: the U.S. does not want a long war and is planning accordingly.
In the 12-Day War last June, Iran was again the side that suffered disproportionately, yet the prolongation of the conflict also shook Israel, and the ceasefire came under the iron fist of the U.S. In this new scenario, in which the U.S. is involved from the very beginning, the question of how many more days or weeks Iran can mount counterattacks is a source of concern for Washington, because victory for the U.S. depends not on inflicting more losses on the other side but on securing Iran’s definite and rapid surrender.
At a March 2 press conference, U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth signaled a shift away from regime-change objectives, diverging from Trump’s earlier statements, and hinted at new force deployments from the Pentagon to the Gulf. This suggests that Washington’s expectation of a quick and decisive victory is not materializing. The prolongation of the war and the continuation of Iranian attacks could, in the U.S. public’s perception, create a Tet Offensive–style effect and a sense of discouragement, overshadowing the material toll reflected in Iran’s losses. It appears that Iran’s strategy, unlike its previous retaliatory actions, is to sustain escalation over time and spread it across the entire Gulf region. In doing so, it aims to turn this conflict into a war without a clear winner and, through the deterrent effect of the resulting costs, preempt potential future attacks. In a sense, this strategy, essentially “if I cannot win, we will lose together,” can be interpreted as a form of conventional mutually assured destruction. Iran is determined not to give the U.S.-Israel coalition an easy victory this time.
